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Abstract 
The concept description formalisms of existing description logics systems allow the user to 
express local cardinality restrictions on the fillers of a particular ole. It is not possible, however, to 
introduce global restrictions on the number of instances of a given concept. This article argues that 
such cardinal&y restrictions on concepts are of importance in applications uch as configuration of 
technical systems, an application domain of description logics systems that is currently gaining in 
interest. It shows that including such restrictions in the description language leaves the important 
inference problems uch as instance testing decidable. The algorithm combines and simplifies the 
ideas developed for the treatment of qualified number restrictions and of general tenuinological 
axioms. 
Keywords: Knowledge representation; Description logics: Terminological reasoning 
1. Introduction 
Description logics (DL) systems can be used to represent the conceptual and tax- 
onomic knowledge of an application domain in a structured and semantically well- 
understood way. To describe this kind of knowledge one starts with atomic concepts 
(unary predicates) and roles (binary predicates), and employs the concept descrip- 
tion formalism provided by the system to define more complex concepts. In addi- 
tion to this terminological component (TBox), most systems also have an asser- 
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tional component (ABox), in which concepts and roles can be instantiated by in- 
dividual names (constant symbols) representing particular elements of the problem 
domain. 
The reasoning services of DL systems allow the user to retrieve not only the knowl- 
edge that is explicitly stored in TBox and ABox, but to access implicitly represented 
knowledge as well. For a given TBox, the system automatically computes the concept hi- 
erarchy according to subconcept-superconcept relationships (subsumption relationships) 
induced by the structure of the concepts. In addition, it can determine the consistency 
of the knowledge base (consisting of a TBox and an ABox), and it answers queries 
regarding the existence of instance relationships between individuals and concepts. 
To make these inference services feasible, the description formalism of a DL system 
must be of limited expressive power. On the other hand, a too severely restricted for- 
malism may turn out to be too weak for certain applications. For this reason, several 
extensions of “core” concept languages have been investigated in the literature (see, e.g., 
[ I, 3,111). In the present paper, we shall consider an extension that is motivated by the 
use of DL systems for solving configuration tasks, which is an application domain that 
is currently gaining more and more importance (see, e.g., [ 5,9, 10,12, 13, 15,19-211). 
Technical domains such as configuration seem to be well suited for DL systems since 
they usually rely on a large number of terminological conventions, which are in most 
cases precisely defined. In contrast, more traditional AI applications of DL systems, such 
as natural language processing [ 71, often rely on vague notions and incomplete knowl- 
edge, which require the representation of beliefs, as well as probabilistic and default 
information. 
Unlike these very demanding, and not yet well-understood extensions of concept 
description languages, the additional language construct we shall introduce in this paper 
is more or less along the lines of traditional constructs, albeit of a rather expressive and 
thus algorithmically hard to handle nature. It allows one to express restrictions on the 
number of elements a concept may have: (3 m C) and (< n C) respectively express 
that the (possibly complex) concept C has at least m elements and at most II elements, 
thus restricting the possible models of the knowledge base. 
The traditional language constructs that most closely resemble this new one are the 
so-called number restrictions, which are present in almost all existing systems. Number 
restrictions allow one to specify the number of possible role-fillers of a particular role. 
Such a restriction can, for example, express that an admissible PC may have at most 17 
parts, by restricting the number of role-fillers of the has-part role to less or equal 17. 
If one allows for qualified number restrictions [ 1 1 ] (which are not available in most 
systems), one can also express that the PC must have exactly one CPU and at most 
four IMB memory chips, where CPU and lMB-memory-chip may be complex concepts. 
These cardinality restrictions are, however, still localized to the fillers of one particular 
role. In contrast, the cardinality restrictions on concepts we propose here are global in the 
sense that they restrict the number of objects belonging to a given concept for the whole 
domain of interest (e.g., the whole technical system that is configured). For example, 
one can express that (in a computer) there must be exactly one electrical power supply 
unit, which supplies all the devices with electrical power. With a conventional concept 
description language, even one including qualified number restrictions, one can only 
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express that every device must have a power supply, but not that all must have the same 
(or one out of a specified number n) . 3 
The expressive power of the new construct is also demonstrated by the fact that it can 
be used to express terminological axioms of the form C g D (see Section 2 below), 
which express that the (possibly complex) concepts C and D have exactly the same 
instances. Such axioms are known to be algorithmically hard to handle (satisfiability is 
EXP-TIME hard) [ 171. 
In a very restricted setting, cardinality restrictions have been considered by van der 
Hoek and de Rijke [ 181. However, their language is far less expressive than ours (satis- 
fiability is in PSPACE) . Like number restrictions and several other concept constructors, 
cardinality restrictions on concepts can be seen as specific generalized quantifiers [ 61. 
In [ 161, Quantz proposes an integration of various generalized quantifiers into termino- 
logical formalisms in order to cope with problems related to bound anaphora resolution. 
However, like most of the research on generalized quantifiers in the area of linguistics 
and philosophical logics, Quantz’s article is only concerned with expressibility issues 
and not with computability. In fact, for his representation language the important in- 
ference problems turn out to be undecidable. The main goal of the present paper is to 
design sound and complete inference algorithms for the language we propose. 
In the following, we shall first formally introduce the terminological formalism consid- 
ered in this paper, which contains both cardinality restrictions on concepts and qualified 
number restrictions. Section 2 also defines the relevant reasoning services for termino- 
logical knowledge bases consisting of a terminological and an assertional component. In 
Section 3 we shortly sketch how these services can be utilized in a configuration appli- 
cation. Then we shall develop an algorithm that tests a knowledge base for consistency. 
This is sufficient since all the other interesting inference services can easily be reduced 
to this task [ 41. The consistency algorithm combines the ideas developed in [ 2,8] for 
handling inclusion axioms (in a language with number restrictions), and in [ 111 for 
handling qualified number restrictions. 
2. The terminological formalism 
The expressive power of a DL system is determined by the constructs available for 
building concept descriptions, and by the way these descriptions can be used in the 
terminological (TBox) and the assertional (ABox) component of the system. The de- 
scription language dICC& defined below coincides with the one introduced in [ 1 I]. 
The new expressivity lies in the TBox, where the usual terminological axioms are re- 
placed by cardinality restrictions on concepts. The assertional component is the standard 
one. 
3 Qualified number restrictions could be used to express cardinality restrictions on concepts if the description 
formalism contained a symbol for the “top-role” (i.e., the universal role that connects all objects with each 
other). However, none of the implemented systems allows for such a top-role symbol, and reasoning in a 
concept language where the top-role and ordinary roles coexist has-to the best of our knowledge-not yet 
been investigated. 
The description language 
The concept descriptions (for short, concepts) of the language ACCQ are built from 
concept names and rote names using the constructors conjunction (C n D >, disjunction 
(C L. D), negation (-C), and qual$ed number restrictions (( 3 n R C) and (< 
II R C) ), where C, D stand for concepts, R for a role name, and n for a nonnegative 
integer. 
Note that (unqualified) number restrictions, value restrictions (VR.C) and existential 
restrictions (3R.C) are not explicitly included in the language since they can all be 
expressed with the help of qualified number restrictions. 
To define the semantics of concept descriptions, we interpret concepts as subsets of 
a domain of interest and roles as binary relations over this domain. More precisely, 
an interpretation Z consists of a set AZ (the domain of Z) and a function .’ (the 
interpretation function of Z). The interpretation function maps every concept name A 
to a subset A’ of AZ, and every role name R to a subset R* of A’ x A’. 
The interpretation function is extended to arbitrary concept descriptions as follows. 
Let C, D be concept descriptions, R be a role name, II be a nonnegative integer, and 
assume that Cz and Dz are already defined. Then 
(CflD)==C=nD? (CUD)‘=C’UD’, (1C)==A’\C=, 
where #X denotes the cardinality of a set X. 
The fetminologicat component 
A terminological axiom is an expression of the form C = D, where C and D are 
(possibly complex) concept descriptions. A tinite set of such axioms is called a TBox. 
The semantics of a TBox is quite obvious: an interpretation Z satisJes an axiom C A D 
iff C’ = D’. and it is a model of a TBox 7 iff it satisfies all axioms in 7 
Most systems impose severe restrictions on admissible TBoxes: ( I) the concepts on 
the left-hand sides of axioms must be concept names, (2) concept names occur at most 
once as left-hand side of an axiom, and (3) there are no cyclic definitions. The effect 
of these restrictions is that terminological axioms are just macro definitions (introduc- 
ing names for large descriptions), which can simply be expanded before starting the 
reasoning process. Unrestricted terminological axioms are a lot harder to handle algo- 
rithmically [ 2,8, 171, but they are very useful in expressing important constraints on 
admissible configurations (see Section 3 below). 
Now we introduce a new type of axiom, which we call cardinality restrictions on 
concepts, and which are even more expressive than unrestricted terminological axioms 
of the form C G D. Such a cardinalit! restriction is an expression of the form (3 
n C) or (< n C), where C is a concept description and H a nonnegative integer. An 
interpretation Z satisJies the restriction (2 )I C) iff flCz > n and (< n C) iff $CZ < 17. 
Obviously, saying that C and D have the same instances is equivalent to stating that 
the concept (C n -D) U (-C n D) is empty, i.e.. contains at most zero elements. 
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This demonstrates that terminological axioms can be expressed by cardinality restric- 
tions. For this reason, a TBox will from now on simply be a finite set of cardinality 
restrictions. The interpretation Z is a model of such a TBox iff it satisfies each of its 
restrictions. 
The assertional component 
In this component, facts concerning particular objects in the application domain can 
be expressed as follows. The objects are referred to by individual names, and these 
names may be used in two types of assertional axioms: concept assertions C(a) and 
role assertions R(a, b), where C is a concept description, R is a role name, and a, b 
are individual names. A finite set of assertions is called ABox. 
In order to give a semantics to assertions we extend the interpretation function to indi- 
viduals. Each individual name a is interpreted as an element a’ of the domain such that 
the mapping from individual names to AZ is 1- 1. This restriction is usually called unique 
name assumption (DNA). The interpretation Z satisfies the assertion C(a) iff uz E C’ 
and the assertion R(a, b) iff (a’, b’) E Rx. We say that an interpretation Z is a model 
of an ABox A iff Z satisfies every assertion in A. 
The reasoning services 
A terminological knowledge base (KEJ) S = (A, 7) consists of an ABox A and a 
TBox 7. After representing the relevant knowledge of an application domain in such a 
KB, one cannot just retrieve the information that is explicitly stored. DL systems also 
provide their users with services that allow to access knowledge that is only implicitly 






KB-consistency: Is the given KB consistent? That is, does there exist a model of 
the KB (i.e., a model of both the ABox and the TBox)? 
Concept satisjability: Given a KB and a concept C, does there exist a model of 
the KB in which C is interpreted as a nonempty set? 
Subsumption: Given a KE3 and two concepts C and D, does Cz C_ Dz hold for 
all models Z of the KB? Subsumption detects implicit dependencies among the 
concepts in the KB. 
Instance checking: Given a KB, an individual a and a concept C, does a’ E C’ 
hold for any model Z of the KB? 
Concept satisfiability, subsumption of concepts, and instance checking can be reduced 
to KB-consistency (or to its complement) in linear time. To make this possible, we 
must introduce an additional syntactic category in the ABox: individuals that are not 
subjected to the DNA. 4 The only difference between this new type of individuals (called 
new individuals) and the usual ones (called old individuals) is that the interpretation 
function must be a l-l mapping only on the old individuals. This means that different 
new individuals may be interpreted by the same object, and a new individual may also 
have the same interpretation as an old one. 
4 The consistency algorithm presented in Section 4 will also make use of individuals not subjected to the 
UNA. 
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Proposition 2.1. Let C, D be concepts, 2’ = (A, 7) a knowledge base, a an individual, 
and let o be a new individual, i.e., an individual that does not appear in 2 and is not 
subjected to the UNA. Then: 
l C is sati@able ifs (d U {C(o)}, 7) is consistent, 
l C is subsumed by D ifl (AU {(C n -D)(o)}, 7) is not consistent, 
l a is instance of C ifs (d U ((7C) (a)}, ‘T) is not consistent. 
Consequently, it is sufficient to devise an algorithm for the KB-consistency problem. 
Note that omitting the UNA for the (new) individual o is crucial for the soundness 
of the reductions. For example, assume that 7; = {( < 1 C)} and di = {C(a)}, where 
C is a concept name. Obviously, the concept C is satisfiable with respect to the KB 
(di,Z), but the KB (Ai U {C(o)},Z) would not be consistent if o was subjected to 
the UNA. In fact, the only way to satisfy (Ai U {C(o)}, 5) is to interpret o and a by 
the same object. 
Also note that in the reductions given above, the ABox cannot be omitted when con- 
sidering subsumption and satisfiability of concepts, and the TBox cannot be expanded. 
This is in contrast to most description logic formalisms, where the following two prop- 
erties are satisfied: ( 1) one can get rid of the concept definitions in the TBox by an 
expansion process, and (2) the ABox does not influence concept satisfiability and sub- 
sumption (see [ 141). Due to the presence of cardinality restrictions, this is no longer 
true for our formalism. Indeed, the (standard) expansion procedure cannot be applied in 
the presence of unrestricted terminological axioms, and thus property ( 1) is no longer 
satisfied. To see that property (2) is violated as well, we extend the ABox di by the 
assertion D(a). Because of the cardinality restriction in I;, a is the only element of C. 
In addition, the new ABox says that a belongs to D, which shows that in all models 
of ‘& and the new ABox, C is interpreted as a subset of D. This yields an additional 
subsumption relationship between C and D, which does not hold with respect to the 
TBox alone. 
3. Application in configuration 
Before describing a consistency algorithm for KBs with cardinality restrictions, we 
give some ideas of how such an algorithm can be employed to solve configuration 
tasks. Of course, in order to build a complete configurator based on this approach, 
further features like truth maintenance, control strategies, interactivity, and an explanation 
component have to be integrated. 
Fig. I contains some parts of the description of a sPARcstation 2 in our terminological 
formalism. The first three axioms of the TBox are traditional concept definitions, which 
(in a top-down manner) introduce names for complex descriptions. A SPARCstation 2 
is defined to have four obligatory parts, namely system unit, monitor, keyboard, and 
mouse and pad. In addition, it may have as optional parts terminals and printers, but 
no other parts are admissible. The concepts standing for the parts are again defined 
by descriptions. In the example, we have just given the (simplified) descriptions of 
the system unit, and of the main logic board, which is a part of this unit. Note that 
(= II R C) is an abbreviation for (3 n R C) n (< n R C). 
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SPARCstation2 A 
The TBox: 
(= I has-part System-Unit) fl (= 1 has-part Monitor) fl 
(= 1 has-part Keyboard) fl (= 1 has-part Mouse&Pad) n 
Vhas-part.(System_Unit I_! Monitor U Keyboard U Mouse&Pad U 
Terminal U Printer) 
System-Unit 4 
(= 1 has-part Main-Logic-Board) n 
(= 1 has-part PowerSupply) fl 
(= 2 has-part Hard-Drive) n 
(= I has-part Diskette-Drive) 
Main-Logic-Board G 
(= I has-part CPU) fl 
(= 16 has-part SIMMslots) n 




Terminal n (2 I has-type VTlOO) 
Terminal n (2 I has-type WY-50) 
(< 1 PowerSupply) 
L (= I is-supplied-by PowerSupply) 
C (= I is-supplied-by PowerSupply) 
& (= I is-supplied-by PowerSupply) 
& (> I has-part Female-male_null_modem_cable) 
& (2 1 has-part Male-male_null_modem-cable) 
The ABox: 
SPARCstationJ(sparci), has-part(sparci, term), Terminal(term), 
has-type(term,vtlOO), VTlOO(vtlO0) 
Fig. I. A SPARCStatiOn 2. 
The next five axioms are inclusion axioms of the form C 5 D, which should be 
read as abbreviations of the corresponding cardinality restrictions (< 0 C n 70). The 
(complex) concepts main logic board, hard drive, and diskette drive are required to have 
a power supply, and certain types of terminals need specific cables. The qualified number 
restrictions in these inclusion axioms express that each part has exactly one power supply, 
but different parts can still have different power supplies. The last terminological axiom, 
which is a cardinality restriction on the concept power supply, makes sure that all parts 
use the same power supply. It seems to be impossible to express such a constraint in 
a traditional terminological formalism unless one allows for role-value maps (which 
would, however, cause undecidability) . 
Configuration checking 
The instance test of a DL system can be employed to check whether a computer 
configuration is admissible. This idea has, for example, been used in an application 
of the DL system CLASSIC [ 211. 5 In the TBox, one defines a concept that describes 
admissible computer systems, and in the ABox one describes the actual configuration of 
a computer system. The instance test then checks whether the individual corresponding 
to the configuration is an instance of the concept “admissible computer system”. The 
description of the actual configuration can be done on different levels of abstraction. 
5 One should note, however, that this application is not restricted to simple configuration checking, and that, 
beside the instance test, the firing of CLASSIC rules-which are not considered here-plays an important role. 
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For example, we can describe a SpARcstation 2 by saying that it has four fillers of the 
has-part role that are respectively in the concepts System-Unit, Monitor, Keyboard, and 
Mouse&Pad. On a lower level of abstraction, the realization that the parts belong to 
these concepts is also left to the instance test. 
In addition. one can also define concepts that describe the most frequent errors 
made when configuring such a system (e.g.. forgetting some cables). When the in- 
stance test finds out that the configuration belongs to such an error concept then one 
knows the reason why the configuration was not admissible, and can take appropriate 
action. 
Cmjiguration generatim 
The configuration domain is again modeled in the TBox. and the ABox contains a 
(high-level) description of what should be configured. The consistency algorithm we 
shall describe below has the property that it not only answers with “consistent” or 
“inconsistent”. If the KB is consistent, it also yields a finite model (see the definition 
of the canonical model in Section 4), in which all the implicit information contained in 
the TBox and ABox is made explicit. In principle, this model describes an admissible 
configuration. 
In Fig. 1, the ABox describes that WC want to have a SPARCstation 2 with an 
additional VT100 terminal. If we invoke the consistency algorithm of Section 4, it will 
generate the obligatory parts like system unit. etc. It also makes sure that the integrity 
constraints expressed by the inclusion axioms and the cardinality restriction are satisfied 
(more information on this idea of configuration by model generation can be found in 
19, 101). 
4. The consistency algorithm 
The method for deciding consistency of a KB presented below is rule-based in the 
sense that it starts with the original KB (consisting of an ABox dn and a TBox lo), 
and applies certain consistency preserving transformation rules to the ABox until no 
more rules apply. If the “complete” KB thus obtained contains an obvious contradiction 
(called clash) then the original KB (Ao,IT) 0 was inconsistent. Otherwise, (A, lo) was 
consistent since the complete KB can be used to construct a finite model. 
The transformation rule that handles number restrictions of the form (3 n R C) 
will generate n PieM; ABox individuals XI.. . , I,, that stand for the role-fillers required 
by the restriction. Recall that unlike the individuals present in the original ABox (the 
old individuals), the new individual names should not be subjected to the unique name 
assumption. In fact, in a model they may well be interpreted identical to an old individual 
or a new individual introduced by another rule application. What must be ensured, 
however, is that XI, . . ,x, are interpreted by different objects. In order to express this 
we need a new type of assertion, called inequality assertion. Such an assertion is of the 
form s +’ t for individuals s, t, and it has the obvious semantics, i.e., an interpretation 
1 satisfies s # t iff s’ f t’. These assertions are considered as being symmetric, i.e., 
saying that s $ t E A is the same as saying that t #s E A. 
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In the following, we assume that the set of individual names is partitioned into a set 
&id of old individual names (subjected to the UNA) and a set Inew of new individual 
names. The elements of IOld are just the individuals present in the original ABox,~ 
which means that I& is finite. We assume that I,,, is infinite to allow for an arbitrary 
number of rule applications. We denote individuals of IOld by the letters a, b, of Z,, by 
X, y, and of 1 = &Id U I,,, by s, t (all possibly with subscript). 
The transformation rule that handles disjunction (as well as the rules concerned with 
at-most restrictions) is nondeterministic in the sense that a given ABox is transformed 
into two (or finitely many) new ABoxes such that the original ABox is consistent with 
the TBox iff one of the new ABoxes is so. For this reason we will consider generalized 
KBs of the form (M,I), where M = {Al,. . . , dl} is a finite set of ABoxes. This 
generalized KB is called consistent iff there is some i, 1 < i _i 1, such that (di,I) is 
consistent. 
Treatment of cardinality restrictions 
So far, all that has been said also applies to rule-based consistency algorithms for 
less expressive languages (see, e.g., [4]). Cardinality restrictions give rise to two new 
problems. 
To see the first problem, assume that the TBox contains the restriction ( < n C), 
and that all individuals contained in the ABox are either asserted to be in C or in its 
complement. If the number m of individuals in C is larger than n then we know that we 
must take action, whereas m < n shows that no action is required. In general, however, 
the ABox will also contain individuals for which no assertions relating them to C or 
-C are present. For these individuals, we do not know a priori whether a model of 
the TBox and ABox will interpret them as elements of C or of -C. Thus we are not 
necessarily able to decide whether action is required or not. 
To make sure that in the end all such indeterminate situations are resolved, we 
introduce a rule (called choose-rule below) that makes sure that at some stage of 
the transformation process each individual will either be asserted to be in C or its 
complement. (The choice is “don’t know” nondeterministic, i.e., both cases have to be 
considered.) In a slightly modified way the idea of such a choose-rule was already 
presented in [ 111, since qualified number restrictions of the form (< n R C) cause a 
similar problem. 
The second problem is that, due to the choose-rule, the transformation process need 
no longer terminate, unless one takes specific precautions to detect cyclic computations. 
In fact, if the concept C from above is of the form (2 m R D) (for m 2 1)) then 
asserting C for an individual SO causes the introduction of a new individual sr . Because 
of the choose-rule, at some stage of the transformation we must consider an ABox were 
sr is asserted to be in C, which causes the introduction of a new individual ~2, etc. 
In order to regain the termination property, we restrict the applicability of transfor- 
mation rules that generate new individuals. The idea is that the application of such rules 
is blocked for a new individual x if there is another individual s in the ABox that 
h Note that the individual o that might have been introduced when reducing the satisfiability or subsumption 
problem to the consistency problem is assumed to be a new individual (see Proposition 2.1). 
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has all concept assertions that x has. Termination is then due to the fact that there are 
only finitely many different concepts D that can occur in such assertions. To prevent 
cyclic blocking, which would destroy the correctness of the algorithm, we consider an 
enumeration to, tl, t2, . . of I in which all elements of lold come before all elements 
of I”,,. We write t < t’ iff t comes before t’ in this enumeration. Now blocking can 
formally be defined as follows: 
Definition 4.1. An individual x E I,,, is blocked by an individual s E I in an ABox A 
iff {D 1 D(x) E A} C {D’ 1 D’(s) E A} and s < x. 
Note that only new individuals can be blocked. 
Similar termination problems are already caused by terminological axioms of the 
form C k D. For this reason, the idea of blocking is already present in [ 81. The main 
difference between the two notions of blocking is that in [ 81 equality of sets is required 
whereas we are satisfied with set inclusion. It turns out that our notion of blocking 
facilitates the termination proof. In addition, termination can be shown for arbitrary 
sequences of rule applications, and no longer depends on the use of a specific strategy 
(as required in [ 81). 
Preprocessing 
In order to facilitate the description of the transformation rules, we start with a 
preprocessing step that transforms the original KB into a simplified form. 
As usual, all concepts occurring in the KB are transformed into negation normal form, 
where negation occurs only immediately in front of concept names. Negation normal 
forms can be computed in linear time by pushing negation signs into the descriptions 
(see, e.g., [4] ). The expression -C will denote the negation normal form of the concept 
-C. 
In addition, we assume that the TBox contains only restrictions of the form (6 II C). 
In fact, a restriction (2 IZ C) can be expressed in the ABox by adding assertions C(Xi) 
and xi +’ x,i (for I 6 i,j < n, i f j), where the x, are new individuals that did not 
occur in the original KB. 
Finally, the UNA for old individuals is made explicit in the ABox by adding the 
assertions a $ b for each pair of distinct elements a. b E fold. 
The transformation rules 
As a result of the preprocessing step, the input of the consistency algorithm is a 
generalized KB ({A}, 70) where A0 and 70 are in the simplified form described above. 
Starting with ({A}, 70). the algorithm applies the transformation rules of Fig. 2 as 
long as possible. 
The rules should be read as follows. They are applied to a generalized KB (M, ‘T(J) 
(where M is a set of ABoxes). The rules take an element A of M, and replace it by 
one ABox A’, by two ABoxes A’ and A”, or by finitely many ABoxes Ai,,j. The TBOX 
70 of the input is left unchanged. 
The transformation rules are sound in the sense that if there is a model for the TBox 
70 and the ABox A, then there is also a model for 70 and one of the ABoxes A 
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The -+-rule 
Condition: A contains (Ct ll Cz) (s), but it does not contain both Cl(s) and 
C2(s). 
Action: A’ := AU {Ct(s),C;!(s)} 
The -+u-rule 
Condition: A contains (Cl u C2) (s), but neither Cl (s) nor C2 (s) . 
Action: A’ := A u {Cl (s)}, d” := A u {G(s)} 
The -+)-rule 
Condition: A contains (2 n R C) (s), s is not blocked in A, and there are no 
individual names st , . . . ,s,, such that R(s,si), C(si), and si # S,j (1 < i,j < 
n, i # j) are contained in A. 
Action: d’:=dU{R(s,xi),C(xi) )l<i<nn)U{xijlx,/ l<i,j<n,i# j}, 
wherext,...,x, E I,,, are distinct individuals such that xi > s’ for all individual 
names s’ occurring in A. 
The -‘e~mw-rule 
Condition: A contains an individual t such that either 
(1) (6 IZ R C)(s) and R(s,t) are in A, or 
(2) (< n C) is in la, 
andddoesnotcontain (CLJ-C)(t). 
Action: A’ := dU{(CU-C)(t)} 
The -+G-rule 
Condition: A contains distinct individuals tl , . . . , tn+l such that either 
(1) (<n R C)(s) and R(s,tl),...,R(s,t,+l) are in A, or 
(2) (< n C) is in 7& 
and C(tl),... , C (t,,+l ) are in A, and t; + t,j is not in A for some i # j. 
Action: For each pair ti, tj such that tj < ti and t; # t,j is not in A the ABox 
di,j := [ ti/tj] A is obtained from A by replacing each occurrence of ti by t,j. 
Fig. 2. Completion rules of the consistency algorithm. 
is replaced by. Thus, if (M, 70) is obtained from ({du}, 70) by a sequence of rule 
applications then (M, TO) is consistent if (da, I) a is consistent (see Section 5 for the 
proof). 
The second important property of the set of transformation rules is that the trans- 
formation process always terminates, i.e., there cannot be an infinite sequence of rule 
applications (see Section 5 for the proof). Thus, after finitely many transformation steps 
we obtain a generalized KB to which no more rules apply. We call such a generalized 
KB complete. Consistency of a complete (generalized) KB ({At,. . . , A,}, ‘&) can be 
decided by looking for obvious contradictions, so-called clashes, in the KBs (di, lo). 
Definition 4.2. A KB (A, 7) contains a clash iff one of the following three situations 
occurs: 
( 1) {B(s) , -d?(s)} 5 A for some individual s and some concept name B. 
(2) {(<nRC)(s),R(s,ti),C(ti),t;+t,jI l<i,j<n+I, i+ j}Gdforindi- 
viduals s, tl, . . . , t,+l, a nonnegative integer n, a concept C, and a role name R. 
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(3) (~nC)t7and{C(.~;)..s,~~,,/I~i.j~~+I, i#j}C:Aforindividuals 
SI). . .s,,+j. a nonnegative integer n, and a concept C. 
Obviously, a KB that contains a clash cannot be consistent. Consequently, if all KBs 
(A,.lo) contain a clash, then ({A,. ,A,,},l) o is inconsistent, which by soundness 
of the rules implies that the original KB (AC), 70) was inconsistent. 
If. however. one of the KBs 2’, = (A,.%) is clash free then the corresponding 
canonical interpretation 21, (as defined below) can be used to construct a model of the 
original KB (A, 70) ( see Section 5 for the proof). 
Definition 4.3. Let ,C = (A, 7) ix a KB. The canonical interpretation Z, induced by 
2’ is defined as follows: 
l The domain d” of 1~ consists of all the individuals occurring in A. 
l For all concept names A we define A” = {s 1 A(s) E A}. 
l For a role name R we define Rx2 inductively with respect to the total ordering < 
on the individual names. If sg is the least element in A” then (SO, t) E R’J iff 
R( SCJ, t) E A. Now let s E AZ’ be different from SO. 
_ If s is not blocked in A then we define (s, I) E Rx’ iff R(s, t) E A. 
_ If s is blocked in A then let s’ be the least (with respect to the ordering <) 
individual name in 3” that blocks s. By the definition of blocking, s’ < s, and 
thus we can assume that the set {I j is’, t) E R“} is already defined, and we 
define (s, r) E RZ2 iff (s’, t) t RI:. 
l For an individual s occurring in A we set .s’~ := s. 
To sum up, we have seen that the transformation rules of Fig. 2 reduce consistency 
of a KB (A, 70) to consistency of a complete generalized KB (M, 70). In addition, 
consistency of this complete KB can be decided by looking for obvious contradictions 
(clashes). This shows the main result of the paper: 
Theorem 4.4. It is decidable whether or ilot a KB (A, 70) is consistent. 
5. Proof of correctness 
To prove Theorem 4.4, we first show that the transformation rules are sound and 
terminating. Then we show that the canonical interpretation of a complete and clash- 
free KB can be used to construct a model of the original KB. 
5.1. Soundness of the rules 
Proposition 5.1. Assume that the generalized KB (M’, lo) is obtainedfrom (M, 76) 0~ 
application of a transformation rule. If (M, 70) is consistent then (M’, ‘XJ) is consistent. 
Proof. In the following, we restrict our attention to the +)-rule and the +c-rule. The 
other rules can be treated similarly. 
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(1) Assume that the +)-rule is applied to the ABox A in M, and that M’ is 
obtained from M by replacing A by A’. Thus A contains an assertion (2 n R C) (s), 
and A’ is obtained from A by adding R( s, xi), C (xi), and xi # xj ( 1 < i, j < n, i # j) , 
where x1,.,.,x, E I,,, are such that x; > s’ for all individual names s’ occurring in 
A. It is sufficient to show that (A’, 70) is consistent if (A, 70) is consistent. 
Thus, let Z be a model of A and lo. Since the new individual names xi,. . . , xn do 
not occur in A, validity of assertions in d does not depend on the interpretation of these 
names. Because A contains ( > n R C) (s), we know that sz E (3 n R C)‘. Thus there 
exist distinct elements di , . . . , d, of AZ with ( Sz, di) E R’ and di E C’ (1 6 i 6 n). 
Obviously, if we modify 7 to an interpretation 7’ by interpreting the new individuals 
Xl,..., X, as Xi I’ = di, then 7’ is a model of A’ and la. 
(2) Assume that the --+g-rule is applied to the ABox A in M. We restrict our 
attention to the case where A contains assertions C( ti ), . . . , C( t,,+i > and 70 contains 
the cardinality restriction (< n C) (the case of the qualified number restrictions can 
be treated analogously). M’ is obtained from M by replacing A by the finitely many 
ABoxes di,,i := [ ti/tj] A (for tj < ti and ti # r,i not in A). 
Now, let 7 be a mode1 of A and 70. Since (6 n C) E 70, we know that Cz contains 
at most n elements. Thus there exist indices i, j (1 < i,j < n + 1, i # j) such that 
t: = t;. Without loss of generality we assume that t,i < ti. Since 7 is a mode1 of A, the 
assertion ti + t,i cannot be contained in A, which implies that [ ti/t,j] A is an element of 
M’. Obviously, 7 is also a mode1 of [ ti/t,i] A and lo. 0 
5.2. Termination 
Proposition 5.2. Let (A, 70) be a jinite KB. Then any sequence of rule applications 
starting with ({A}, 70) is 3nite. 
Before we can prove the proposition we have to introduce some notation. If a trans- 
formation rule replaces the ABox A by A,, . . , , An, we write A -+ di (for all i with 
1 6 i < n). In order to express which rule has been applied, the arrow is equipped with 
the appropriate subscript; e.g., A --+G di means that the -+G-rule has been applied. 
For an ABox A and an individual name s, we define 
CA(s, d) := {C 1 C(s) is a concept assertion in d}. 
Obviously, the new individual x is blocked by s in A iff s < x and CA(x, A) C 
CA(s,d). 
The following facts are an easy consequence of the way the transformation rules and 
CA are defined: 
Lemma 5.3. 
( 1) Let A -+ A’, and let s be an individual in A that is not replaced in A’. Then 
we have CA(s, A) C CA( s, A’). If ti is an individual in A that is replaced by 
t,i in A’ then we have 
t,i < ti, CA(ti,d) 5 CA(t.i,d’) and CA(ti,d) C_ CA(t,i,d’). 
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(2) Let (A, 70) be a,finite KB, let (M, 70) be obtainedfrom this KB by ajinite num- 
ber of applications of transformation rules, and let A be an element of M. For 
all concept assertions C(s) E A, the concept description C is a subdescription 
of a description D U -D, where D occurs in (&,lo). 
( 3 ) The second fact shows that there are only jinitely many diflerent sets CA( s, A) 
,for a given sequence ?f transformations starting from a jkite KB. 
Proof of Proposition 5.2. To prove Proposition 5.2 we assume to the contrary that 
there exists an infinite sequence of rule applications, which yields the KBs ({da}, la), 
(M,,lo), (ML%),.... S’ ince a transformation rule replaces one ABox by only finitely 
many new ABoxes, Kiinig’s lemma implies that there is an infinite sequence of ABoxes 
A,, A2, . such that JLZO + AI - AA? - ‘. 
For any individual s occurring in these ABoxes, there are only finitely many different 
concept assertions possible. Each rule application adds concept assertions on an indi- 
vidual or removes an individual. Thus, to have an infinite sequence of rule applications, 
infinitely many individuals must be generated, which means that the +2-rule must have 
been applied infinitely often. In addition, to a fixed individual s, the +a-rule cannot be 
applied infinitely many times. Indeed. s can occur in only finitely many different at-least 
assertions, and to each at-least assertion, the -+a-rule is applied at most once. This 
shows that there must be infinitely many individuals st , ~2, ~3,. . . to which the +>-rule 
was applied. Since, for any individual name s, there are only finitely many smaller 
individual names, we may without loss of generality assume that si < s:! < .Q < . ., 
and since loid is finite we may assume that all these individuals are new individuals, i.e., 
elements of I,,,. 
For all i, let A,,, -+> A;, r~ be the transformation step at which the +a-rule is applied 
to s,. Now consider the sets CA(.Si, Ai, ). Since there are only finitely many different 
such sets, there must be indices k < I such that CA( sk, A.,k ) = CA( SI, A.,,). If Sk is still 
present in A,i, (i.e., it has not been replaced by an application of the +G-rule), then 
CA(.r/, A.,,) = CA( sk, A;,) & CA(sk, A.,, ). Since .sk < s( and SI is a new individual, 
this means that SI should be blocked in d,,, which is a contradiction to our assumption 
that the -+a-rule is applied to SI in A.!,. 
If Sk is no longer present in Ai, then it has been replaced (possibly iteratively) by 
another individual, say t, and we know that t < sk. Since in each replacement step the 
replacing individual inherits all the concept assertions of the replaced individual, we 
know that CA(sk, A.i,) C CA( t, A,,,). Again, we can conclude that sl is blocked in A,,,. 
This completes the proof of termination. 0 
5.3. Completeness 
Let ({Ao)~‘&) b e a generalized KB obtained as the result of our preprocessing 
step. This means that 70 contains only at-most restrictions. The ABox do may contain 
concept assertions and inequality assertions both for old and new individuals, but all 
role assertions are of the form R(a, b) for old individuals a, 0. 
Assume that (M, 7~) IS a complete generalized KB that was obtained by starting 
with ({A}, 70) and applying the transformation rules of Fig. 2 until no more rules 
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apply. Let A E M be such that 2 = (A, 70) does not contain a clash, and let 1~ be the 
corresponding canonical interpretation. In the following, we show that Z, can be used 
to construct a model of (do, lo). 
First, note that 1~ need not be a model of 2 = (d,lc). The problem is that an 
individual s that is blocked in A need not have been blocked at an earlier stage of 
the transformation process. Thus, at such an earlier stage, the -+)-rule may have been 
applied to s, generating an individual t with R(s, t) E A. This role assertion need not 
be satisfied by the canonical interpretation (see the definition of role-fillers for blocked 
individuals in the definition of the canonical interpretation). 
However, 12 is a model of a certain subset of A, and this will be sufficient to show 
the desired result. 
Definition 5.4. The set of relevant assertions of an ABox a is defined as 
rel( a) := {C(s) 1 C(s) is a concept assertion in a} 
U {R(a, b) / R(a, b) E B and a, b E &,~a} 
U {s + t 1 s # t is an inequality assertion in B} 
Thus, rel(Z3) is obtained from B by removing all role assertions involving new 
individuals. Since the ABox Jlo obtained by preprocessing does not contain role assertion 
for new individuals, we know that rel(dc) = &,. 
Lemma 5.5. Let 2 = (A, 70) b e a complete and clash-free KB. Then the canonical 
interpretation 12 is a model of (rel( A), 70). 
Proof. First, consider a role assertion R( a, 6) E rel( A). We know that a, b E &Id, and 
thus a cannot be blocked. By the definition of the canonical interpretation, R(a, b) E A 
thus yields (a, b) E R’x. 
Second, consider an inequality assertion sl $ s2 E rel(d). Since individual names 
interpret themselves in X2, it is sufficient to show that st and s:! cannot be identical 
names. Obviously, the ABox A0 obtained after the preprocessing step does not contain an 
inequality assertion of the form s # s, and it is easy to see that this property is invariant 
under rule application. In fact, the only rule that “identifies” different individual names 
is the --+G-rule. But this rule is applied for individuals ti and t,j only if ti # t,j is not 
contained in the ABox. 
Third, consider a concept assertion C(s) E rel(d). We show by induction on the 
structure of C that s E CT-‘. Note that C(s) E rel( A) iff C(s) E A. 
( 1) Assume that C is a concept name B. Then B(s) E A implies s E BZz by 
definition of the canonical interpretation. 
(2) Assume that C is of the form 7B for a concept name B. Since A was assumed to 
be clash free, we know that B(s) is not contained in A, and thus s # B’x by definition 
of the canonical interpretation. 
(3) Assume that C is of the form Ct n C2 for concept descriptions Ct and C2. Since 
the -+-,-rule is not applicable to A, we know that A contains both Ct (s) and C:!(s). 
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By induction, we can deduce that s E CF’ and s E Cc’, which obviously implies 
s E (C, rlC?)=i. 
(4) The case where C is of the form Ci u C2 can be treated analogously. 
(5) Assume that C is of the form (3 II R D). We have to distinguish two cases: s 
can be blocked or not. 
(5. I ) Assume that s is not blocked. Thus, since the --1a-rule is not applicable, we 
know that A contains individuals ~1, , s,, such that the assertions R( s, s,), D( si), and 
,s, + s, ( 1 < i,.j < n, i # j) are in A. Because s is not blocked, R(s, si) E A implies 
( s. .r;) E RZ2 (by definition of ZA ). In addition, induction yields Si E D”. Finally, since 
we already know that 21 satisfies all inequality assertions in A, the s; are all different 
from each other. This shows that .c E (3 II R 0)‘~. 
(5.2) Now, assume that s is blocked in A. Let s’ be the least (with respect to the 
ordering <) individual name in d’l that blocks s. 
First, we show that .Y’ is not blocked. Otherwise, the individual s” that blocks s’ 
satisfies s” < s’ < s and CA( s, A) C CA( .P’. A) C CA( s”, A). Thus s” blocks s and 
is smaller than s’, which is a contradiction. 
Because CA(s,d) C CA(s’,d) we have (3 II R D)(d) E A. As shown in (5.1) 
this implies that there are distinct individual names si , . s,, such that (s’, s;) E RI’ 
and .P, E D’J. By definition of the canonical interpretation, we also have (s, s;) E RZ2, 
which yields s E (2 n R D)‘>. 
(6)AssumethatCisoftheform(6nRD).Inordertoshowthats~(~nRD)’~ 
we assume to the contrary that there exist distinct individuals $1,. . , s,,+I such that 
(s. s,) E Rx’ and s; E D’> (for i = I,. . II + I ). Again, we have to distinguish two 
cases, depending on whether s is blocked or not. 
(6. I ) Assume that s is not blocked. Then (s, s,) E RI’ implies R( s, s;) E A. Since 
the ~+chooFe-rule is not applicable. we know that (D u -D) (si) is in A for all i, and 
since the --tU-rule is not applicable, we have for all i that either D(s,) or -vD(s;) is in 
A. By induction, -D(s;) E A would yield s, E (-D)z2 = (-D)zL.7 Thus, si E D” 
yields D(s;) E A for i = 1,. . ,II + 1. This is a contradiction, since now either the 
A<-rule must be applicable, or A must contain a clash. 
(6.2) Now, assume that s is blocked in A. Let s’ be the least (with respect to the 
ordering <) individual name in A” that blocks s. 
As in (5.2), we can deduce that s’ is not blocked, and that A contains the assertion 
(6 II R D) (s’). In addition, (s, s;) E Rx’ implies (.s’, s,) E RZ’ (by definition of 12). 
Thus we can proceed as in (6. I ), with s’ in place of s. This completes the proof that 
Z\ satisfies all the concept assertions in A. 
Finally, consider an element (6 II C) cf the TBox 70. Assume that there are II + I 
different individuals si,. . , s,,+l E A” such that s, E C’: for i = 1,. . . ,H + 1. As 
in (6.1) above, the fact that the +choose-rule is not applicable can be used to show 
that C(s,) E A. Again, this is a contradiction, since now either the -+c-rule must be 
applicable, or A must contain a clash. This completes the proof that Z, is a model of 
(r&d), lo). 0 
’ We assume that the negation sign does not contribute to the size of a concept term. Thus ND has the same 
size a5 D (cf. I I I I). 
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Lemma 5.6. Assume that 23 -+ l3’ and that Z’ is a model of reJ(t3’) and 70. Then 
there exists an interpretation Z that is a model of rel( f3) and 70. 
Proof. If t3’ is obtained from J3 by an application of the 3% +u-, +)-, or -‘choose- 
rule then J3 is a subset of J?‘. Thus, reJ(J3) c reJ(B’), which shows that we can simply 
use Z := Z’. 
Thus, the only interesting case is the -+f-rule. This means that B’ = [ti/tj]B is 
obtained from J3 by replacing each occurrence of ti by tj (for some individuals ti and 
ti in J3). We know that t,i < ti and that ti + t,i is not in J3. Since ti has been replaced 
by ti, we also know that ti does not occur in B’. Hence, if we define Z such that Z 
is identical to 2’, with the exception that ti r := t:, then we know that Z is a model of 
reJ( a’). It remains to be shown that Z is also a model of reJ(J3). 
Let (+ be the substitution that replaces ti by t,i, and leaves all the other individuals 
unchanged. Since J3’ = [ ti/tj]D we know for all individuals s in J3 that C(s) E reJ(f3) 
(respectively s # t E reJ( J3) ) implies C ((+( s) ) E reJ( JY) (respectively a(s) # (+( t) E 
reJ(B’)). In addition, by our definition of 1, we have ark = s’. This shows that all 
the concept and inequality assertions in reJ(J3) are satisfied by 1. 
Finally, let R(a, b) be a role assertion in reJ(J3). Thus we know that a and b are old 
individuals. Neither of these two individuals can be equal to ti. To show this, assume 
(without loss of generality) that a is equal to ti. Since tj < ti = a, this implies that t,i 
is also an old individual. But then we have ti +’ t,i in B (because in the preprocessing 
step the unique name assumption for old individuals has been made explicit). This is a 
contradiction since the -+f-rule generates the ABox [ ti/t,i] B only if ti # t.i is not in J3. 
Since a and b are different from t; we know that R(a, b) is also contained in reJ(B’), 
and we are done. 0 
To sum up, Lemma 5.5 shows that 2-2 is a model of the clash-free and complete KB 
(reJ( A), 57~). By applying Lemma 5.6 iteratively, we can deduce that (reJ(&) , ‘;ro) has 
a model. Since the ABox da obtained after preprocessing satisfies reJ(da) = da, we 
thus know that (A, ;rO) has a model. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.4. 
6. Conclusion 
We have shown how to extend a terminological KR formalism by a construct that 
can express global restrictions on the cardinality of concepts. The usefulness of these 
cardinality restrictions on concepts was demonstrated by an example from a configuration 
application. 
Because of the possibility of global restrictions, knowledge bases in our new for- 
malism have significantly different properties from knowledge bases in more traditional 
terminological formalisms. We have seen that in the presence of cardinality restrictions, 
subsumption between concepts depends not only on the TBox, but also on the ABox. 
In addition, it is no longer true that unconnected objects (i.e., objects not connected by 
role relationships) in an ABox or a model cannot influence each other. This complicates 
the algorithmic treatment of the new construct. 
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Unlike role-value maps, however (which could be used to model similar situations), 
our new construct leaves all the important inference problems decidable. As a lower 
complexity bound, we know that KB-consistency is EXP-TIME-hard, since cardinality 
restrictions on concepts can express general terminological axioms, for which EXP- 
TIME-hardness is known [ 171. Our algorithm yields as upper bound NEXP-TIME, but 
it is not clear whether a deterministic exponential time algorithm can be derived. 
The consistency algorithm combines and simplifies the ideas developed for the treat- 
ment of qualified number restrictions and of terminological axioms. In particular, our 
new definition of blocked objects allows for a termination proof that does not require a 
specific strategy for rule application. 
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